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STATE OF NEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE
Name:

Thaines, Michael

NYSID:
DIN:

Facility:

Woodboume CF

Appeal
Contr:ol No.:

09-ll 5-18B

84-B-2088

Appe~ances:

· Decision appealed:

Thomas Kaczkowski, Esq.
P.O. Box 203
Wurtsboro, New York 12790
August 2018 decision denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 18
months.

Board Member(s)
who participated:

Cruse, Berliner, Shapiro

Papers considered:

Appellant's Briefreceived January 8, 2019
Appellant's Supplemental Brief r~cei ved January 8, 2019

Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation

Records relied upon:

Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case
.

~~

The undersigned determine that the decision appealed is hereby: .

/-

(

:

a mmissioner

_

Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _

Modified to _ _.__ _

-

Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ __

.

_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to _ _ __

.

.

If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written
reasons for. the Parole Board's determination!!!..!!!! be annexed hereto.
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separ .te fi dings of
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on 4 (:;/.a ·-n tf6'.

Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Pa(ole File - Central File
P-2002(B) (1112018)
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Name:

Thames, Michael

Facility: Woodbourne CF
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Findings: (Page 1 of 6)
Appellant was sentenced to 25 years to life upon his conviction of Murder in the Second
Degree (2 counts) and Robbery in the First Degree. In the instant appeal. Appellant challenges the
August 2018 determination of the Board denying release and imposing a 18-month hold on the
following grounds: (1) the Board failed to adequately consider all required factors, including the
rehabilitative component of Executive Law § 259-i as required by the 2011 amendments; (2) the
decision is arbitrary and capricious because the Board placed undue emphasis on the instant
offense; (3) the decision thereby violated due process; (4) the Board improperly denied release
despite low COMPAS scores and considered an unsupported score for reentry substance abuse;
(5) the decision is conclusory and unsupported; (6) Appellant was denied a meaningful opportunity
for release because the Board failed to consider his age in violation of both the ban on cruel and
unusual punishment and due process; (7) the Board was biased against him because one
Commissioner unjustifiably mentioned an old Tier III infraction despite improvement and it played
a role in the decision; and (8) the Board issued a predetermined decision and denied release based
on its personal opinion of the instant offense. These arguments are without merit.
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.” Executive Law § 259i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014). Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior. People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd.
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner
is discretionary.” Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s
discretion. See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v.
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight. Matter
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016). In the
absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must
be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty. Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole,
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204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990).
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered
the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense wherein Appellant stabbed and bludgeoned
to death a 16 y.o. female friend in her apartment, in the presence of her 2 y.o. sister, while there to
rob her; Appellant’s account of the incident indicating he hit the victim a few times with barbells
and fled after she stabbed him in the eye, head and back with his knife and blocked his exit; that
this is Appellant’s first State term; his institutional record including participation in AVP and
NA/AA among other programs, educational efforts and discipline reflecting three new Tier II
infractions which the Board acknowledged as improvement in light of prior Tier IIIs such as for
assaults, violence, harassment and weapons; his mental health and substance abuse history; and
release plans to seek enrollment in a program with Ready, Willing and Able and apply for disability
assistance. In addition, the Board considered that Appellant was 17 years old at the time of the
instant offense, the circumstances of his youth and his subsequent development. The Board also
had before it and considered, among other things, the pre-sentence investigation report, the Parole
Board Report, Appellant’s case plan, the COMPAS instrument, and Appellant’s parole packet.
That the Board did not comment on and analyze on the record every aspect of Appellant’s
institutional record and release plans does not constitute convincing evidence that the Board did
not consider them.
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in
determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).
In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the gravity of the instant offense and
Appellant’s lack of insight in view of his account of the offense. See Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d
at 478, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704; Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996,
997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290
A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002). And while recognizing the COMPAS instrument
presented Appellant as low risk overall, the Board disagreed and cited the elevated reentry substance
abuse score in view of the role drug use played in the serious instant offense. See Matter of Bush v.
Annucci, 148 A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Wade v. Stanford, 148
A.D.3d 1487, 52 N.Y.S.3d 508 (3d Dept. 2017).
The Board’s determination – after considering the full record – that the severity of the
inmate’s crime outweighed other factors was within its discretion. Matter of Kirkpatrick v. Travis,
5 A.D.3d 385, 772 N.Y.S.2d 540 (2d Dept. 2004); see also Matter of Robinson v. New York State
Bd. of Parole, 162 A.D.3d 1450, 81 N.Y.S.3d 235 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Walker v. Travis,
252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Carrion v. New York State Bd. of
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Parole, 210 A.D.2d 403, 404, 620 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 (2d Dept. 1994). An inmate has no
Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration of a valid sentence.
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100,
2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980). The New
York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not create
a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause. Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 7576, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001).
Appellant’s suggestion that the Board failed to comply with the 2011 amendments to the
Executive Law is likewise without merit. The 2011 amendments require procedures incorporating
risk and needs principles to “assist” the Board in making parole release decisions. Executive Law
§ 259–c(4). The Board satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument. Matter
of Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also
Matter of Hawthorne v. Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016);
Matter of LeGeros, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d
1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014). However, the COMPAS is not predictive
and was never intended to be the sole indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs
information from a variety of sources, including the statutory factors and the interview. Notably,
the 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case
review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors, including the instant offense. The
amendments also did not change the substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when
deciding whether to grant parole. Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A). Thus, the COMPAS cannot
mandate a particular result. Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d
Dept. 2016). Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along
with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.
See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d
Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept.
2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept.
2017). That is exactly what occurred here.
In addition to other required matters, the Board considered Appellant’s COMPAS instrument
which was not uniformly low. See Matter of Crawford v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 144
A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016), lv. denied, 29 N.Y.3d 901, 57 N.Y.S.3d 704
(2017). This includes “probable” for the reentry substance abuse scale. Appellant’s suggestion
that his score is low based on the figure associated with the scale is misplaced. That figure simply
indicates how he compared to a norm group composed of the offender population as a whole and
is not an indication that his score is low in absolute terms. Contrary to Appellant’s claim, his
institutional record did not render the Board’s concern about the elevated substance abuse score
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irrational in view of the role drugs played in Appellant’s brutal crime. See Matter of Bush, 148
A.D.3d 1392, 50 N.Y.S.3d 180.
The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(d), as it was sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the
denial of parole. Matter of Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82
N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d
435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628
(3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002).
The Board addressed many of the factors and principles considered in individualized terms and
explained those that ultimately weighed most heavily in its deliberations, including the gravity of
the offense and Appellant’s lack of insight. The Board is not required to address each factor
considered in its decision. Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141,
1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). Appellant objects to the Board’s assessment of his insight
and the COMPAS instrument’s substance abuse score. However, it was well within the Board’s
authority to make an assessment of Appellant’s credibility (Matter of Siao-Pao v. Dennison, 51
A.D.3d 105, 108, 854 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (1st Dept.), aff’d, 11 N.Y.3d 777, 866 N.Y.S.2d 602
(2008)) and the Board’s assessment of his insight is amply supported by the record. While broadly
stating he used “poor judgment” and “bad decision making” resulting in his taking an innocent life
(Tr. at 3), he failed to truly take responsibility for his brutal crime and demonstrated no meaningful
insight. Furthermore, the Board does not determine COMPAS scores and an administrative appeal
is not the proper forum to challenge the COMPAS instrument. And as indicated, the Board’s concern
with the reentry substance abuse score was not irrational.
The Board’s obligation to consider an inmate’s youth (under 18) in relation to the
commission of the instant offense arises from the Third Department’s decision in Matter of
Hawkins v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 140 A.D.3d 34, 39, 30 N.Y.S.3d
397, 400 (3d Dept. 2016), and the Board’s amended regulations, 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(c).
Consistent with that obligation, the decision explicitly acknowledges Appellant’s youth at the time
of the offense and the interview transcript demonstrates the Board considered his youth, attendant
circumstances, and subsequent development as required. 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(c); Matter of
Hawkins, 140 A.D.3d 34, 30 N.Y.S.3d at 400. Indeed, Appellant also complains that the Board
gave too much attention to his age at the time of the offense. (Br. at 5.) The Board began the
interview with an inquiry into the inmate’s age at the time of the crime and confirmed he was 17.
(Tr. at 3.) The panel discussed with him his youth and he was given the opportunity to speak at
length about various matters, including schooling; that he devoted himself to being a promoter and
producer helping other community youth; that he sought money from the victim so he could buy
marijuana to protect his image; that his mother allowed elders to take him out and he began
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carrying a weapon (a knife) to be like them because he felt responsible for his talent’s well-bring
like the elders were for him; that he lived with his mother and seven siblings and there was no
father figure in the household; that he did odd jobs and summer youth program jobs; and that he
used marijuana daily. (Tr. at 3-5, 11, 13-14, 18.) The panel also discussed with him that he is now
53 and his development, including his discipline, programming, and educational efforts. (Tr. at
13, 16-18, 19-20.) The Board considered the inmate’s youth at the time of the offense, but
ultimately placed greater emphasis on other factors, including the gravity of his crime and his lack
of insight, “as it was entitled to do.” Matter of Allen v. Stanford, 161 A.D.3d 1503, 78 N.Y.S.3d
445 (3d Dept.) (citing Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1274, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714), lv. denied, 32
N.Y.3d 903 (2018)).
While Appellant argues the Board was biased by a Commissioner’s improper mention of a
Tier III ticket that played a role in the denial decision, the Board committed no error by considering
Appellant’s entire disciplinary record, including a Tier III ticket stemming from an assault on a female
correction officer. We further note the Commissioner was observing that, while Appellant received
three new Tier II tickets, he was showing improvement considering his prior disciplinary history
included assaults on staff and inmates, violent conduct and weapons and “it’s good to see that you
sort of turned the corner…” (Tr. at 16.) Likewise, the Board’s decision acknowledged his discipline
improved since his last appearance. Thus, there is no record support to prove an alleged bias or that
the decision flowed from such bias. Matter of Hernandez v. McSherry, 271 A.D.2d 777, 706
N.Y.S.2d 647 (3d Dept. 2000), lv. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 769, 722 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2000); see also
Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).
There also is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined or based on the panel’s
personal opinion of the instant offense. See Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56
N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d
1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New York State Div. of Parole, 276
A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). That the Board ultimately denied parole following
its consideration of the full record does not mean the decision was predetermined or based on the
panel’s personal opinion of the offense. See Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239
A.D.2d 235, 240, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418-19 (1st Dept. 1997). Appellant’s suggestion that the Board
retried him and the denial of parole release amounted to an improper resentencing is without merit
inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the propriety of release per Executive
Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth therein. Executive Law § 259 et
seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept.
2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d
672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001). In so doing, the Board properly considered the instant
offense and the pre-sentence investigation report reflecting that the victim, who was found naked

STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE

APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION
Name:

Thames, Michael

Facility: Woodbourne CF

DIN:

84-B-2088

AC No.: 09-115-18 B

Findings: (Page 6 of 6)
but for a bra, was stabbed and bludgeoned to death and committed no error by considering that
Appellant was not forthcoming about his crime. See Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 478, 718
N.Y.S.2d 704; Matter of Crawford, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 46 N.Y.S.3d 228. The appellant has not in
any manner been resentenced. Matter of Mullins, 136 A.D.3d at 1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698.
In conclusion, Appellant has failed to demonstrate the Board’s decision was not made in
accordance with the pertinent statutory requirements or was irrational “bordering on impropriety.”
Matter of Silmon, 95 N.Y.2d at 476, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704 (quoting Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 69,
427 N.Y.S.2d 982).
Recommendation:

Affirm.

